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Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of authentication
on effective capacity (EC) of an underwater acoustic (UWA)
channel. Specifically, the UWA channel is under impersonation
attack by a malicious node (Eve) present in the close vicinity
of the legitimate node pair (Alice and Bob); Eve tries to inject
its malicious data into the system by making Bob believe that
she is indeed Alice. To thwart the impersonation attack by
Eve, Bob utilizes the distance of the transmit node as the
feature/fingerprint to carry out feature-based authentication at
the physical layer. Due to authentication at Bob, due to lack
of channel knowledge at the transmit node (Alice or Eve), and
due to the threshold-based decoding error model, the relevant
dynamics of the considered system could be modelled by a
Markov chain (MC). Thus, we compute the state-transition
probabilities of the MC, and the moment generating function
for the service process corresponding to each state. This enables
us to derive a closed-form expression of the EC in terms
of authentication parameters. Furthermore, we compute the
optimal transmission rate (at Alice) through gradient-descent
(GD) technique and artificial neural network (ANN) method.
Simulation results show that the EC decreases under severe
authentication constraints (i.e., more false alarms and more
transmissions by Eve). Simulation results also reveal that the
(optimal transmission rate) performance of the ANN technique
is quite close to that of the GD method.
Index Terms—Effective capacity, authentication, underwater
acoustic, quality-of-service, artificial neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Underwater acoustic sensor networks (UWASN) are utilized
by a multitude of applications, e.g., resource finding, marine-
life exploration, marine pollution monitoring, and security of
oil rigs [1], [2]. As of today, a wide range of (theoretical
and hands-on) research problems related to UWASN have
been reported in the literature, e.g., channel capacity, the
acoustic modem design, routing protocols, full-duplex, source
localization, to name a few [3–6].
This work studies the two-pronged challenge of secure
and reliable communication over an underwater acoustic
(UWA) channel. The security challenge arises because the
UWA channel–being a broadcast medium–is prone to various
kinds of attacks by adversaries. On the other hand, the
reliability challenge implies that the data sent on the UWA
channel is delay-sensitive, and thus, quality-of-service (QoS)
constrained.
Security front first: There are only a handful of works
that discuss the security requirements, classification of various
active and passive attacks, and potential solutions for the
UWASN. As one would expect, most of the security solutions
are crypto-based, while very few works discuss physical-layer
security solutions (to complement the crypto-based security
solutions at the higher layer) [7]. This paper considers im-
personation attack on a UWASN and thwarts it by utilizing
distance as a feature for doing feature-based authentication at
the physical layer. Note that various (device-based or medium-
based) fingerprints/features have been reported in the literature
on physical layer security, e.g., received signal strength [8],
channel impulse response [9], channel frequency response
[10], path loss, carrier frequency offset [11], distance, angle-
of-arrival, position [12], non-reciprocal hardware [13], and
non-linearity of power amplifiers [14].
Next, the reliability front: One way to quantify the QoS
offered by a UWA link is by computing the effective capacity
(EC)—maximum throughput of the channel under QoS con-
straints. More formally, the EC is the maximum sustainable
constant arrival rate at a transmitter (queue) in the face
of a randomly time-varying (channel) service, under QoS
constraints [15]. The EC tool has witnessed its application
to a diverse set of problems for QoS performance analysis,
e.g., cognitive radio channels [16], [17], systems with various
degrees of channel knowledge at the transmitter [18], two-
hop systems [19], [20], correlated fading channels [21], and
device-to-device communication [22].
The work closest to the scope of this paper is [23] and its
extension [24], whereby the impact of authentication on the
delay performance of mission-critical, machine-type commu-
nication networks has been reported. Specifically, [23] and
[24] assume a closed and protected environment (whereby
Eve’s transmissions do not reach Bob) and utilize the tool
of stochastic network calculus to quantify the dependence of
delay violation probability on false alarms (inherited in the
physical layer authentication mechanism). Contrary to [23]
and [24], this paper considers a UWA channel and an open
environment for communication (whereby Bob can receive
messages from Eve as well) and utlizes the EC tool. In
short, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the impact of
authentication constraints on the EC of a UWA channel has
not been studied in the literature so far.
Contributions: The contribution of this paper is two-fold.
1) We investigate the impact of authentication on the EC
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of a UWA multipath channel. To this end, we provide a
closed-form expression of the EC in terms of authentication
parameters. 2) We formulate the optimal transmission rate
problem as an optimization program, and solve it via gradient-
descent and artificial neural network methods.
Outline: Section II introduces the system model, problem
statement and the UWA multipath channel model. Section
III describes the distance-based authentication mechanism.
Section IV presents the EC analysis. Section V computes
the optimal transmission rate using the gradient-descent and
artificial neural network methods. Section VI provides some
numerical results. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CHANNEL MODEL
A. System Model and Problem Statement
We consider a scenario whereby a sensor node (Alice)
deployed underwater reports its sensing data to a buoy node
(Bob) on the water surface, via a time-slotted UWA channel
(see Fig. 1). For the UWA link between the legitimate node
pair (Alice and Bob), we study the two-pronged challenge
of secure and reliable communication. More precisely, the
security threat studied in this paper is impersonation attack,
while the QoS of the underlying shared UWA channel is
assessed and quantified via the EC framework.
Alice
Eve
Data Center
Queue
Bob
Fig. 1. System model: The UWA link between the legitimate node pair
(Alice and Bob) is QoS-constrained, and is under impersonation attack by a
nearby adversary Eve.
As shown in Fig. 1, the impersonation attack is led by Eve,
which is a malicious node present underwater in the close
vicinity of Alice. That is, Eve is an active adversary who
tries to inject malicious data into the system (i.e., into the
data center through Bob). More precisely, Eve—being a clever
impersonator, and not a mere jammer—transmits during the
slots left unused by Alice1 in order to deceive Bob that she
is indeed Alice. This necessitates that Bob authenticates each
and every packet it receives from the shared UWA channel.
1Eve can accomplish this through spectrum sensing technique.
To this end, Bob measures the distance of the UWA channel
occupant (Alice or Eve) from itself and utilizes it as the
feature/fingerprint for binary hypothesis testing in order to
carry out feature-based authentication at the physical layer. On
the reliability front, the EC framework allows us to compute
the maximum constant arrival rate at the Alice’s queue in the
face of fading multipath UWA channel, given a statistical QoS
constraint.
Note that the authentication process results in occasional
rejection of Alice’s (delay-sensitive) data by Bob due to
false alarms. This in turn requires re-transmission of that
data by Alice in the upcoming slot, and hence, affects the
QoS provided by the considered UWA link. Thus, studying
the interplay between authentication and EC is of utmost
importance, and this is precisely the agenda of this paper.
B. Channel Model
We consider a wideband, time-slotted UWA channel with
T seconds long time-slots. Furthermore, the transmit nodes
(Alice and Eve) utilize orthogonal frequency division mul-
tiplexing (OFDM) scheme with N sub-carriers, while Tg is
the guard interval between two consecutive OFDM symbols.
Thus, the effective slot length is Ts = T + Tg .
For the multipath UWA channel, we adopt the widely-
acclaimed, statistical model from [25]. Let H(f) represent
the transfer function/channel frequency response (CFR) of the
underlying UWA channel. The values of H(f) at sub-carrier
frequencies f (i) = f0+i∆f (where i = 0, ...,N−1) are denoted
by H(i) =H(f (i)) and assumed to be constant over a subband
of width ∆f = 1/T . Furthermore, the channel gain H(i) seen
by sub-carrier i is composed of L paths as follows [25]:
H(i) = 1√A L∑l=1hle−j2pif(i)ξl , (1)
where A is the total attenuation (due to spreading and
absorption), while hl and ξl are the path gain and the
path delay of the lth path, respectively. Furthermore,
H(i) ∼ CN(∑Ll=1 clE{hl}, σ2L∑Ll=1 ∣cl∣) [25]. Here, cl =
1√Ae−j2pif(i)ξl , σL = σl ∀l, CN stands for complex normal
distribution, and E(.) is the expectation operator.
III. IMPERSONATION ATTACK DETECTION
This section succinctly describes the distance-based au-
thentication framework implemented by Bob to thwart the
impersonation attack by Eve. Specifically, we provide here a
brief sketch of the binary hypothesis test constructed by Bob
and the associated error probabilities.
A. Distance-based Authentication
During each slot, Bob makes a noisy measurement of
the distance dn of the channel occupant (Alice or Eve)
from itself.2 With this, Bob implements the distance-based
2[12] describes a time-of-arrival/round-trip time-based method for distance
estimation in a UWA channel.
authentication as the following binary hypothesis test (BHT):⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩H0 ∶ dn = dA + e (Declare Alice)H1 ∶ dn = dE + e (Declare Eve), (2)
where dA (dE) represents the true distance of Alice (Eve)
from Bob, and e is the estimation error. Under least-squares
estimation framework, e ∼ N(0, σ2).
Let T = dn − dA. Further, let τ = ∣T ∣ be the test statistic.
Then the BHT in (2) could be (re-)formulated as: τ
H1≷
H0
,
where  is a threshold. Essentially, Bob compares the noisy
distance measurement dn with the pre-stored ground truth dA.
Thereafter, if the test statistic τ is less than the threshold ,
then H0 occurs; otherwise, H1 occurs.
Note from (2) that dn∣H0 ∼ N(dA, σ2), and dn∣H1 ∼
N(dE , σ2). Then, T ∣ H0 ∼ N(0, σ2) and T ∣ H1 ∼
N(dE − dA, σ2). With this, we are ready to compute the two
error probabilities associated with the BHT: false alarms and
missed detections. The probability of false alarm (wrongly
rejecting Alice’s data) is:
Pfa = P (H1∣H0) = P (τ > ∣H0) = P (∣T ∣ > ∣H0) = Q( 
σ
),
(3)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi ∫ ∞x e− t22 dt is the complementary cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of N(0,1). Similarly, the
probability of missed detection (success rate of Eve) is:
Pmd = P (H0∣H1) = P (τ < ∣H1) = P (∣T ∣ < ∣H1) = 1−Q( −m
σ
),
(4)
where m = dE −dA. Note that Pmd is a random variable (RV)
since we do not know dE . Thus, we find the expected value
of Pmd by assuming that dE ∼ U(a, b), i.e., Eve is neither too
close, nor too far away from Bob:
P¯md = E{Pmd} = 1(b − a) ∫ ba PmdddE . (5)
Next, to compute the threshold , we utilize the Neyman-
Pearson (NP) method which states that one cannot minimize
the two errors Pfa, Pmd simultaneously. The NP method,
however, guarantees to minimize Pmd once a maximum-
tolerable value of Pfa is pre-specified. This allows us to
systematically compute the threshold  as follows:
 = σQ−1(Pfa). (6)
Finally, the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) is a measure
of how reliable the distance measurements are (and thus,
the BHT). The KLD D(p(τ ∣H1)∣∣p(τ ∣H0)) is given as: D =∫ ∞−∞ p(τ ∣H1) log(p(τ ∣H1)p(τ ∣H0))dτ = −mσ2 .
IV. EFFECTIVE CAPACITY ANALYSIS
A. Definition
The EC is defined as the log of moment-generating function
(MGF) of the cumulative service process S(i)(t) in the limit
(for sub-carrier i) [15]:
ECi = −Λ(i)(−θ)
θ
= − lim
t→∞ 1θt ln{E(e−θS(i)(t))} [bits/slot],
(7)
where S(i)(t) = ∑tk=1 s(i)(k), with s(i)(k) being the channel
service (i.e., number of bits delivered) on sub-carrier i during
slot k. θ is the so-called QoS exponent.
The EC could be thought as the maximum constant arrival
rate that can be supported by a randomly time-varying channel
service process, while also satisfying a statistical QoS require-
ment specified by the QoS exponent θ. Moreover, since the
average arrival rate at Alice’s queue is equal to the average
departure rate when the queue is in steady-state [26], EC can
also be seen as the maximum throughput in the presence of
QoS constraints. One could also see that θ → 0 implies delay-
tolerant communication, while θ → ∞ implies delay-limited
communication.
B. Implications of Lack of Channel Knowledge at Alice
We assume that the channel state information at the trans-
mitter (CSIT) is not available at Alice (and Eve). In other
words, the system is not equipped with a feedback channel that
Bob could utilize to share the measured CSI to the channel
occupant. Let r(i)A represent the Alice’s data rate on sub-carrier
i. Then, due to lack of CSIT, Alice transmits data to Bob at
a constant rate on all sub-carriers, i.e., r(i)A = rA,c bits/sec
for i = 1, ...,N . Furthermore, the lack of CSIT prompts Alice
to distribute its power budget PA equally among the N sub-
carriers, i.e., P (i)A = PAN .3
As for the communication link between the channel oc-
cupant and Bob, a threshold-based (ON/OFF) error model
is considered. That is, assuming that Alice is the channel
occupant, if the fixed rate r(i)A is less than the instant channel
capacity C(i)A (k) during the slot k, then the link conveys r(i)A
bits/sec and is said to be in ON condition. On the other hand,
if r(i)A is greater than C(i)A (k), the link conveys 0 bits/sec and
is said to be in OFF condition.4
In short, due to authentication at Bob, due to lack of CSIT
at the channel occupant, and due to the threshold-based error
model, the relevant dynamics of the considered system could
be modelled by a Markov chain.
C. Markov Chain Representation of the UWA Channel
Table I describes the Markov chain representation (with
eight states) of the UWA channel faced by the sub-carrier
i. For the states 1 − 8 defined in Table I, let P(i) represent
the transition probability matrix with [P](i)u,v = p(i)u,v being the
transition probability from state u (at slot k − 1) to state v
(at slot k). Note that the state of the link changes after a slot
3Due to lack of CSIT, it is reasonable to assume that Eve also transmits
at a fixed rate on all sub-carriers, i.e., r(i)E = rE,c bits/sec for i = 1, ...,N .
Furthermore, the lack of CSIT also prompts Eve to do equal power allocation
among the N sub-carriers, i.e., P (i)E = PEN .
4When the link is in OFF condition, the bits sent by the channel occupant
need to be re-transmitted (e.g., using the automatic repeat request mechanism)
during the next slot.
TABLE I
MARKOV CHAIN REPRESENTATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE UWA
CHANNEL FACED BY THE SUB-CARRIER i.
State Description Notation
1 Bob correctly detects Alice and the
link is ON (si(k) = r(i)A Ts) H0∣H0 & r
(i)
A < C(i)A (k)
2 Bob correctly detects Alice and the
link is OFF (si(k) = 0) H0∣H0 & r(i)A > C(i)A (k)
3 Bob correctly detects Eve and the
link is ON (si(k) = 0) H1∣H1 & r(i)E < C(i)E (k)
4 Bob correctly detects Eve and the
link is OFF (si(k) = 0) H1∣H1 & r(i)E > C(i)E (k)
5 Bob wrongly detects Alice as Eve
and the link is ON (si(k) = 0) H1∣H0 & r(i)A < C(i)A (k)
6 Bob wrongly detects Alice as Eve
and the link is OFF (si(k) = 0) H1∣H0 & r(i)A > C(i)A (k)
7 Bob wrongly detects Eve as Al-
ice and the link is ON (si(k) =
r
(i)
E Ts)
H0∣H1 & r(i)E < C(i)E (k)
8 Bob wrongly detects Eve as Alice
and the link is OFF (si(k) = 0) H0∣H1 & r(i)E > C(i)E (k)
duration, i.e., Ts (due to block fading). Next, we compute the
state transition probabilities, starting with p1,1:5
p1,1 = P{τ ∣H0(k) <  & r(i)A < C(i)A (k) ∣
τ ∣H0(k − 1) <  & r(i)A < C(i)A (k − 1)}. (8)
The computation of p1,1 in (8) could be simplified as
follows:
p1,1
(a)=P{τ ∣H0(k) <  ∣ τ ∣H0(k − 1) < }.
P{r(i)A < C(i)A (k)∣r(i)A < C(i)A (k − 1)}(b)=P{τ ∣H0(k) < }P{r(i)A < C(i)A (k)},
(9)
where the equality (a) follows from the fact that the fading
process {C(i)A }k is independent of the authentication process{τ}k, and (b) follows from the fact that each of the two
stochastic processes is memoryless, i.e., C(i)A (k)∣C(i)A (k−1) =
C
(i)
A (k) and τ(k)∣τ(k − 1) = τ(k).
Let γ(i)A represent the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the
link seen by the sub-carrier i when Alice transmits.6 Specif-
ically, γ(i)A = P (i)A ∣H(i)A ∣2σ2n with σ2n as the variance of the
circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian noise. Next, since
C
(i)
A = ∆f log2(1 + γ(i)A ), computing P{r(i)A < C(i)A } is
equivalent to computing P{γ(i)A > 2 r(i)A∆f − 1}, which is simply
the complementary CDF of γ(i)A evaluated at 2 r
(i)
A
∆f − 1.
Proposition 4.1: γ(i)A ∼ χ22(λ(i)A ). That is, γ(i)A is non-central
chi-squared distributed with two degrees-of-freedom and the
non-centrality parameter λ(i)A = 2P (i)A Aσ2nL ∣ ∑Ll=1 cl,AE{hl,A} ∣2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
5We drop the sub-carrier index i for simplicity of notation.
6Since both stochastic processes are memoryless, we drop the time index
k for notational simplicity.
Due to Proposition 4.1, P{r(i)A < C(i)A (k)} =(Q1(√λ(i)A ,
√
2
r
(i)
A
∆f − 1)), where Qx(., .) is the Marcum Q-
function with λ(i)A = 2P (i)A Aσ2nL ∣ ∑Ll=1 cl,AE{hl,A} ∣2 and degree
x. Next, P{τ ∣H0(k) < } = P (H0∣H0) = pi(A)(1 − Pfa),
where pi(A) is the prior probability of Alice. Therefore:
pu,1 = p1 = pi(A)(1 − Pfa)(Q1(√a,√b)), (10)
where a = λ(i)A ,b = 2 r(i)A∆f − 1. Note that the state-transition
probability p1,1 does not depend on the original state (which is
1). In general, pu,1 = p1 for any state of origin u. Furthermore,
due to Proposition 4.1, γ(i)E ∼ χ22(λ(i)E ) with λ(i)E = 2P (i)E Aσ2nL ∣∑Ll=1 cl,EE{hl,E} ∣2. Therefore:
pu,2 = p2 = pi(A)(1 − Pfa)(1 −Q1(√a,√b))
pu,3 = p3 = pi(E)(1 − Pmd)(Q1(√c,√d))
pu,4 = p4 = pi(E)(1 − Pmd)(1 −Q1(√c,√d))
pu,5 = p5 = pi(A)(Pfa)(Q1(√a,√b))
pu,6 = p6 = pi(A)(Pfa)(1 −Q1(√a,√b))
pu,7 = p7 = pi(E)(Pmd)(Q1(√c,√d))
pu,8 = p8 = pi(E)(Pmd)(1 −Q1(√c,√d)),
where c = λ(i)E ,d = 2 r(i)E∆f − 1. pi(E) is the prior probability
of Eve, pi(E) = 1 − pi(A) (i.e., Eve utilizes those slots
which are idle). With this, each row of P(i) becomes:[p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8]. Note that P(i) has rank 1 due
to identical rows, and is a stochastic matrix (since the sum
along each row is equal to 1).
D. Effective Capacity of the UWA Channel
With entries of P(i) computed, we utilize the following
result to calculate the EC of the sub-carrier i [27]:
Λ(i)(θ)
θ
= 1
θ
ln(sp(Φ(i)(θ)P(i))). (11)
The above result states that for a Markov service process
S(i)(t) with its dynamics modelled by P(i), the MGF is given
as sp(Φ(i)(θ)P(i)), where sp(.) represents the spectral radius
of a matrix and Φ(i)(θ) is a diagonal matrix which contains
the MGFs of the service process in the eight states as its
diagonal elements.
Note from Table I that s(i) = r(i)A Ts bits for state 1, s(i) =
r
(i)
E Ts bits for state 7, and s
(i) = 0 bits for the remaining states.
Accordingly, the MGF of state 1 is eθr
(i)
A
Ts , MGF of state 7
is eθr
(i)
E
Ts , while the MGF for each of the remaining states
is 1. Thus, Φ(i)(θ) = diag([eθr(i)A Ts ,1,1,1,1,1, eθr(i)E Ts ,1]).
Next, since Φ(i)(θ)P(i) is also a matrix of unit-rank, finding
its spectral radius is equivalent to finding its trace. Thus, the
EC/throughput (bits/sec) of sub-carrier i under statistical QoS
and security constraints is:
ECi = −1
θTs
[ ln(p1eθr(i)A Ts+p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p7eθr(i)E Ts+p8)].
(12)
Finally, the net EC/throughput for the considered UWA
channel (i.e., OFDM with N sub-carriers) is given as [28]:
ECtot = N∑
i=1 ECi. (13)
V. OPTIMAL TRANSMISSION RATE OF ALICE
Equation (12) reveals that Alice could further optimize
its transmission rate (for sub-carrier i) as follows: r(i)∗A =
arg max
r
(i)
A
>0 ECi. That is:
r
(i)∗
A = arg max
r
(i)
A
>0
−1
θTs
[ ln(p1eθr(i)A Ts+ 6∑
w=2pw+p7eθr(i)E Ts+p8)].
(14)
Equivalently, we have:
r
(i)∗
A = arg min
r
(i)
A
>0 [p1eθr(i)A Ts + 6∑w=2pw + p7eθr(i)E Ts + p8]. (15)
Table 1 reveals that Eve is active during states 3,4,7,8; there-
fore, the transition probabilities p3, p4, p7, p8 are irrelevant
when optimizing (15) with respect to (w.r.t.) r(i)A . Discarding
the irrelevant terms and simplifying the remaining terms, we
get:
r
(i)∗
A = arg min
r
(i)
A
>0Pc,A(eθr(i)A Ts − 1)Q1(√a,√b), (16)
where Pc,A = pi(A)(1 − Pfa) is the probability of correctly
detecting Alice. Let Cf = Pc,A(eθr(i)A Ts − 1)Q1(√a,√b).
A. Gradient-descent based Approach
One can verify that the cost function Cf in (16) is a convex
function [29]. Thus, taking its derivative w.r.t. r(i)A and using
the product rule, chain rule and the result of [29], we get:
∂Cf
∂r
(i)
A
= Pc,AQ‘1(a, b)(eθTsr(i)A − 1) + Pc,AQ1(a, b)(eθTsr(i)A θTs),
(17)
where Q‘1(a, b) = ∂Q1(a,b)∂r(i)
A
= − I0(ab)e− (a2+b2)2 ln(2)2 r(i)A∆f
2∆f
and
I0(.) is the zero-order modified Bessel function. Now, setting
∂Cf
∂r
(i)
A
equal to zero, we get:
Q1(a, b)
I0(ab)e −(a2+b2)2 2 r(i)A∆f =
ln(2)(eθTsr(i)A − 1)
2∆fθTse
θTsr
(i)
A
. (18)
Deriving a closed-form solution for r(i)A from (18) is quite
involved (because Q1(a, b) and I0(ab) both contain infinite
number of terms). Luckily, we have the gradient in the hand;
therefore, we compute the optimal rate r(i)∗A through iterative
gradient-descent (GD) method. The control-law for the GD
method is given as:
r
(i)
A (m) = r(i)A (m − 1) − α∆∣r(i)
A
(m−1), (19)
where m is the iteration number, α is the step-size and ∆ is
the gradient of the cost function Cf (see (17)).
B. Artificial Neural Network based Approach
The GD method iteratively solves the arrival rate opti-
mization program, while the number of iterations depends on
the initialization of the variables and the step size. In this
subsection, we solve the transmit rate optimization problem
as a regression problem by leveraging the artificial neural
network (ANN) approach. The motivation behind proposing
an ANN-based solution for optimal rate prediction is to
realize a fast and computationally less-expensive algorithm
as compared to the iterative GD solution.
Fig. 2 shows the proposed ANN architecture with 3 layers:
an input layer with 4 neurons, a hidden layer with 4 neurons,
and an output layer with one neuron. Thus, the number
of parameters that are to be learned by this ANN is 25
(hidden layer has 20 parameters, while the output layer has 5
parameters). The set of input features consists of θ, a, Pfa,
and pi(A).
In order to train the ANN, we generated a dataset with
input feature vectors and passed it to the iterative GD method
which returned the optimal rate labels. We used the rectified
linear unit (ReLu) as an activation function at the hidden
layer (which enforces the constraint on the arrival rate, i.e.,
it should be positive), and the loss function as mean square
error (MSE) at the output layer. ReLu can be expressed as
f(z) =max(0, z), where z is the input. The loss function is
given as: ∑Ri=1 (Y iactual−Y ipredicted)2
R
, where Y iactual is the label
of the training data, Y ipredicted is the output of ANN for a
specific test input, and R is the size of the dataset.
Input Layer Hidden Layer Output Layer
Pfa
 
 ( )
a
 
( )∗
 
Fig. 2. The proposed ANN architecture.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
All simulations (Matlab-based and Python-based for ANN)
are performed using an Intel Core i7-4770 octa-core processor
with the 8 GB memory. We consider T = 50 ms long slots,
and use OFDM scheme with N = 256 sub-carriers with sub-
carrier spacing ∆f = 20 Hz and guard interval Tg = 16 ms
[25]. Each of the CFR tap gain ∣Hi∣ is generated from the
Rice distribution with shape parameter K = 1. Finally, we set
σ2 = 1 and σ2n = 1.
Fig. 3 verifies that ECi is indeed a concave function of r
(i)
A ,
i.e., an optimal transmission rate r(i)∗A does exist. Additionally,
Fig. 3 reveals that the ECi decreases with the increase in Pfa
(as expected). We further notice that the optimal transmission
rate r(i)∗A increases slightly as θ (the QoS constraint) increases.
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Fig. 3. ECi is a concave function of r
(i)
A . To obtain this plot, an exhaustive
search over r(i)A was performed in (14) under equal priors, i.e., pi(A) = pi(E).
Fig. 4 studies the impact of authentication on the EC.
Specifically, Fig. 4 demonstrates that the EC decreases as
the authentication constraints become more severe (i.e., with
increase in either the probability of false alarm or the prob-
ability of transmission of Eve), and vice versa. Additionally,
an increase in θ leads to a reduction in the EC.
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Fig. 4. Impact of authentication parameters (Pfa and pi(E)) on ECi.
ANN Setup: For training data, we generate 90000×4 input
samples along with 90000 × 1 corresponding output labels.
Specifically, the input dataset is generated by varying each
of θ, pi(A), Pfa using a step size of 0.1, while keeping the
remaining features fixed. As for the non-centrality parameter
a of the SNR γ(k)A , we generate 100 random samples of a for
each value of the remaining feature set. The ANN is trained
at a learning rate of 0.001 for 150 epochs. This learning rate
is reduced by the factor of 10 after every 25 epochs. Training
data is further divided into training set and validation set for
every epoch. Specifically, during each epoch, 80% training
data is used for training the ANN and the remaining 20%
is used as validation set. The MSE loss between the actual
output and the predicted output is used to steer the ANN in
the right direction.
Fig. 5 plots the optimal transmission rate predicted by
the ANN when a test input (basically, 100 random sam-
ples/realizations of the input features) is applied, and com-
pares it against the optimal rate returned by the GD method.
Fig. 5 clearly shows that the ANN method performs very close
to the GD method. The recorded MSE was around 1.8 for
different test data sets of the same size.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the GD method and the ANN method.
Last but not the least, we also determined the simula-
tion time (using the tic-toc command) to compute the op-
timal transmission rate r(i)A , for the GD method and the
ANN method. Specifically, as we changed N in the range[32,64,128,256] sub-carriers, the simulation times were
recorded to be [2.79,5.70,11.08,22.21] seconds for the GD
method, and [0.02,0.03,0.06,0.13] seconds for the ANN
method. Thus, the ANN method is roughly two orders of
magnitude faster than the GD method.7
VII. CONCLUSION
This work studied the trade-off between authentication and
EC for a UWA channel that was under impersonation attack by
7Note that the time-complexity of the ANN method is considered for the
test data only. The reason of omitting the training time is that we train the
ANN only once, while for the GD method, the iteration-based mechanism
remains unchanged whenever a new input (feature) sample is provided.
a malicious node Eve. Specifically, a closed-form expression
of the EC was derived as a function of authentication param-
eters. Furthermore, the optimal transmission rate (at Alice)
was computed using the GD method and the ANN method.
Simulation results showed that more transmissions by Eve and
more false alarms (i.e., more severe authentication constraints)
reduce the EC—the QoS provided by the UWA channel, and
vice versa.
Future work will study the scenarios when the transmit
nodes (Alice and Eve) have various degrees of channel knowl-
edge (e.g., full, partial, and statistical).
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1
The channel gain at sub-carrier i is H(i) ∼
CN(∑Ll=1 clE{hl}, σ2L∑Ll=1 ∣cl∣), where cl = 1√Ae−j2pifiξl
and σL = σl ∀l. Next, ∣H(i)∣ is Ricean distributed
with shape parameter K = ∣∑Ll=1 clE{hl}∣2
σ2
L∑Ll=1 ∣cl∣ = ∣∑Ll=1 clE{hl}∣2σ2L LA .
Equivalently, ∣H(i)∣ ∼ Rice(√ 2A
L
∣ ∑Ll=1 clE{hl} ∣, σL).
Assuming unit variance for the path’s distribution
(i.e., σ2l = 1), ∣H(i)∣2 is distributed as non-central
chi-squared with two degrees-of-freedom and non-
centrality parameter (√ 2A
L
∣ ∑Ll=1 clE{hl} ∣)2. Finally,
γi ∼ χ22 ( 2P (i)Aσ2nL ∣ ∑Ll=1 clE{hl} ∣2). Adopting the notation for
Alice, γiA ∼ χ22 ( 2P (i)A Aσ2nL ∣ ∑Ll=1 cl,AE{hl,A} ∣2).
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